Constitutional Law: \u3ci\u3eInternational Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee\u3c/i\u3e: Is the Public Forum a Closed Category? by Newberry, Gary E.
Oklahoma Law Review 
Volume 46 Number 1 
1-1-1993 
Constitutional Law: International Society for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee: Is the Public Forum a Closed 
Category? 
Gary E. Newberry 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gary E. Newberry, Constitutional Law: International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee: Is the 
Public Forum a Closed Category?, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 155 (1993), 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol46/iss1/12 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Oklahoma Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma 
College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact darinfox@ou.edu. 
NOTES
Constitutional Law: International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee: Is the Public Forum a Closed
Category?
L Introduction
First Amendment public forum analysis is a judicial doctrine balancing the
public's free speech interests against the government's proprietary interests over
public property. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
the freedom of speech.' However, that right is not absolute.
The United States Supreme Court has upheld the government's power to regulate
speech under certain conditions.2 One such condition exists where the government
is acting as a proprietor over public property and seeks to maintain the property's
intended function. Public forum analysis is utilized by the courts to determine the
permissible extent that government may regulate speech in the interest of
maintaining the efficient use of public property and facilities.
The United States Supreme Court, in International Society for Krishna Conscious-
ness, Inc. v. Lee (ISKCON III),' upheld a government agency's regulations that
prohibited solicitation at the three airports under the agency's control. ISKCON III
held that the airports were nonpublic forums.4 The government regulations at issue
were held to be reasonable and to meet the applicable reasonable basis standard of
review.
First, this note summarizes the history of the First Amendment public forum
doctrine. The rationale of the district court (ISKCON I), court of appeals (ISKCON
II), and Supreme Court (ISKCON III) are examined. Next, this note analyzes the
1. The First Amendment provides in full: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of ihe press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. "[Flreedom of speech and of the press which is secured by the Constitution, does not confer an
absolute right to speak or publish .... " Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925); see also Cox
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965) ("[T]he rights of free speech and assembly, while fundamental
in our democratic society, still do not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may address
a group at any public place and at any time.").
3. 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992). For purposes of clarity, the opinion of the United States Court for the
Southern District of New York is referred to as ISKCON I; the opinion of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit is referred to as ISKCON Ii; and the opinion of the United States
Supreme Court is referred to as ISKCON IL
4. Id. at 2706. For discussion of the legal significance of the distinction between public and
nonpublic forums, see infra text accompanying notes 6-43.
5. ISKCON III, 112 S. Ct. at 2708. For discussion of the reasonable basis standard of review, see
infra note 26.
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First Amendment speech values implicated by ISKCON Il. Finally, this note
concludes that ISKCON III has devitalized the public forum doctrine by foreclosing
the future creation of new public forums.
11. The Public Forum Doctrine
The public forum doctrine is relatively new.6 Public forum analysis addresses
whether government regulation of speech in publicly owned areas and facilities is
constitutional.7 The public forum doctrine dates back to Hauge v. Committee for
Industrial Organization, decided in 1939.
6. Government regulation of speech in publicly owned areas was first addressed in the 1897 case
Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897). However, the public forum doctrine has developed primarily
since the 1970s. The first Supreme Court opinion using the phrase "public forum" was in 1961. See
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961). Since 1961 the phrase "public forum"
has been widely used. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992); Forsyth County v.
Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. 2395 (1992); Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992); Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991); Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991); Renne v. Geary, 111 S. Ct. 2331 (1991); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n,
111 S. Ct. 1950 (1991); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
7. For a more detailed discussion and historical background of public forum analysis, see generally
C. Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forum: Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 109 (1986) Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak; The Misleading Nature of Public Forum
Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219 (1984); Harry
Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. Cr. REV. 1; Robert C. Post,
Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV.
1713 (1987); Geoffrey R. Stone, Fora Americana: Speech In Public Places, 1974 SUP. Cr. REV. 233;
Werhan, The Supreme Court's Public Forum Doctrine and the Return of Formalism,.7 CARDOZO L. REV.
335 (1986).
8. 307 U.S. 496 (1939). In Hauge, members of the Committee for Industrial Organization
challenged a municipal ordinance that forbade all meetings and pamphleteering in the streets and other
public areas without a permit. Id. at 502. The Court held that the ordinance was void on its face. Id. at
516.
Hauge describes the origin and scope of the public forum doctrine. Id. at 515-16. Streets and parks
were described as being hlc Id in trust for use by the public, and as historically being used for purposes
of assembly and the discussion of public questions. Id. Further, the use of such public places has long
been considered part of the liberties and rights of the citizenry. Id. However, these rights are not
completely uncircumscribed.
The citizens' right to use public places for speech activities was characterized in Hauge as being
relative to the government's interest in preserving order and peace. Id. at 515. The government may
regulate speech in the interests of all. Id. However, the government can not, in the guise of regulation,
abridge or deny citizens the right to use public property for expressive activity. Id.
Hauge took away the government's unfettered discretion to restrict speech activity on public property.
Hauge was a departure from the rule set forth in Commonwealth v. Davis, 167 U.S. 43 (1897). In Davis
the court upheld the conviction of a preacher who had addressed a crowd in the Boston Common in
violation of a city ordinarce. Id. at 44. The Court adopted dicta from then Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes' decision in the lower court. Judge Holmes stated that
"[flor the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park
is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a private house
to forbid it in his house." Id. at 47 (quoting Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 511 (1895), affld,
167 U.S. 43 (1897)). Daiis concluded that the preacher had no right to use the common except as




Hauge held that speech cannot be absolutely prohibited by legislation in the
traditional public forum However, two years later, in Cox v. New Hampshire,"
the Supreme Court held that legislation may impose restrictions regulating the time,
place, or manner of expression."
Thirty-one years after Cox, the Court extended the right of access for speech
activities to public property which had not been traditionally used for expressive
purposes. In Grayned v. City of Rockford,2 Justice Marshall stated that the crucial
issue in public forum analysis is whether the manner of expression is incompatible
with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time. 3
In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,4 decided two years after Grayned, the
Supreme Court returned to the public forum/nonpublic forum distinction, rejecting
Grayned's speech compatibility test. In 1983, nine years after Lehman, the Court
developed a tripartite framework for analyzing the relationship of First Amendment
interests to government property in Perry Education.Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators
Hauge recognized that the citizenry had a right to use publicly owned property for free expression.
Hauge, 307 U.S. at 516. The Court held that the government's authority to regulate speech would be
circumscribed in public areas traditionally dedicated to public use. Id. These areas are labeled as
"classic" or "traditional" public forums.
9. Hauge, 307 U.S. at 515-16.
10. 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
11. Id. at 571. Cox upheld an ordinance which prohibited unlicensed parades upon the public streets.
Id. at 576. The Court reasoned that civil liberties depend on an organized society capable of maintaining
public order. Id. at 574. Therefore, municipal restrictions on the use of public property were not
necessarily inconsistent with civil liberties. Id.
12. 408 U.S. 104 (1972). In Grayned, the Court upheld an anti-noise ordinance which prohibited
any person from making noise or causing a diversion which would disturb the peace or order of the
school session. Ld. at 107-08.
13. Id. at 104. Grayned assessed a speech regulation's reasonableness by whether the regulation was
narrowly drawn to further a legitimate state interest. Id. at 116-17. Grayned expanded the public forum
inquiry to include not only the consideration of a forum's public or nonpublic nature, but whether a
proposed use of a forum was functionally incompatible with the forum's normal activity. See Werhan,
supra note 7, at 412 (stating that Grayned shifted the burden to the government to demonstrate the
functional incompatibility of a manner of expression with the activity normally conducted at a forum).
Grayned did not focus upon whether the speech the government sought to regulate occurred in a
public or nonpublic forum. The Court did not automatically presume that the government could exclude
speech activity from nontraditional public property.
14. 418 U.S. 298 (1974). In Lehman, Harry J. Lehman, a candidate for the office in the Ohio State
House of Representatives, submitted a political advertisement for display in the card space inside the city
transit system buses. The city had a regulation forbidding political advertisements in the buses and
rejected Lehman's proffered ad.
The Court classified commercial advertising space on a city's transit system buses as a nonpublic
forum. Id. at 302. The Court returned to its pre-Grayned analysis by relying on the public fo-
rum/nonpublic forum distinction as the determinative factor in whether government restrictions on speech
were proper,
Lehman analyzed the physical characteristics of the buses, the city's purpose for the advertising
spaces, and the primary function of the forum. Id. at 303-04. Lehman determined that no public forum
existed. Id. at 304. The Court deferred to the city council's judgment without requiring the council to
demonstrate whether the proposed speech activity was incompatible with the normal use of its transit
system buses. Id. at 302-04.
1993]
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Ass'n. 5 Perry articulated three categories of public property, 6 providing tests with
more particularity than the three-factor analysis used in Lehman.
According to Perry, the first category of public property is the "quintessential"
or "traditional" public forum. 7 Perry defined the traditional public forum as places
that have traditionally been dedicated to assembly and debate or have attained the
status of traditional public forum by government fiat. 8 Examples of the traditional
public forum are places which are held in trust for use by the public and have been
traditionally used for purposes of public assembly, communication, and debate;
namely, streets and parks. 9
The second category of public property defined in Perry includes property that
the state has opened to the public for expressive purposes.' Examples of this
"limited public forum" category include state university meeting facilities,2
municipal theatres,' and school board meetingsY Perry held that the government
must show that its speech regulations serve a compelling state interest and are
narrowly drawn.u This "strict scrutiny" standard of review applies to the first two
categories of public property defined in Perry.
The nonpublic forum is the third category of public property in Perry. According
to Perry, the nonpublic forum encompasses property that has not traditionally, or
by designation, served as a forum for public communication' Speech regulations
in the nonpublic forum are reviewable under the reasonable basis standard.'
Perry's public forum categories were utilized in United States v. Kokinda,27 a
15. 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). In Perry, the Court classified an interschool mail system and teacher
mailboxes as a nonpublic forum and found no First Amendment violation when the teachers' elected
union was granted access to the system but such access was denied to a rival union. Id. at 54-55.
16. Il at 45.
17. Il
18. Id.
19. Id.; see also Hauge, 307 U.S. at 515.
20. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
21. Id. (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)).
22. Id. (citing Southea,,tern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975)).
23. Id. (citing Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167
(1976)).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 46.
26. Id. Under the reasonable basis standard, speech regulations must be reasonable and "not an
effort to suppress expressicn merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view." Id. Such
regulations "can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are
reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral." Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985). The reasonable basis standard is a limited
standard of review. Id. at 808. To pass the reasonable basis test a speech restriction need only be
reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation. Id.
27. 497 U.S. 720 (1990). In Kokinda, a political advocacy group that had solicited contributions on
the sidewalks outside a post office challenged a Postal Service regulation prohibiting the in-person
solicitation of money on postal premises. l at 724. In a plurality opinion, four Justices held that the
post office sidewalk was no a traditional public forum. Id. at 727. The Court applied a reasonableness
test to the Postal Service regulations and found that the regulations were based on reasonable




1990 United States Supreme Court case. Writing for the plurality in Kokinda,
Justice O'Connor held that a post office sidewalk was not a public forum.' Justice
O'Connor rejected the argument that because the post office sidewalk was
physically indistinguishable from a municipal sidewalk, it must be a traditional
public forum and subject to strict scrutiny.' Justice O'Connor stated that the mere
physical characteristics of public property do not determine the property's forum
classification.' Further, because the public is granted free access to government
property does not convert such property into a public forum."
Kokinda also considered whether the post office sidewalk could be classified as
a limited public forum. The Court held that the Postal Service had not explicitly
dedicated its sidewalk to any expressive activity?' Moreover, the Postal Service's
allowance of some speech activities on postal property did not equate to a
government dedication of a forum for speech activities.33
Kokinda held that the post office sidewalk fit into the third category of public
property described in Perry, the nonpublic forum.' Justice O'Connor emphasized
the purpose and function of the post office sidewalk in classifying it as a nonpublic
forum 5 She distinguished the postal sidewalk at issue from a nearby municipal
sidewalk that paralleled a roadway.? Justice O'Connor placed significance on the
fact that the post office sidewalk led only from the-post office parking area to the
front door of the post office, whereas, the municipal sidewalk constituted a public
thoroughfare."
According to Justice O'Connor, the post office sidewalk lacked the characteristics
of a public sidewalk traditionally open to expressive activity.38 The post office
sidewalk was constructed solely to serve postal patrons and was not designed as a
28. ld. at 727.
29. Id.
30. Id. (citing Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976)). In Greer, a prohibition against demonstrations
and the distribution or posting of any publication on a military base (Fort Dix) without prior approval
of a specified military authority was upheld. Greer, 424 U.S. at 835-37. Greer held that military
reservations have not traditionally served as a place for flee public assembly and debate. Id. at 838.
Under a reasonable basis standard of review, the speech regulations of the base passed constitutional
muster. Id. at 863. The military interest was stated to be a unique need to insist upon a respect for duty
and discipline from new recruits and the protection of troop morale and discipline from civilian
interference. Id. at 848-49.
31. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727; see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S.
788, 802 (1985) ("The government does not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited
discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse.); Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983) ("[S]elective access does not transform
government property into a public forum.").
32. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 744-45.
36. Id. at 745.
37. Id. at 742.
38. Id. at 727-28.
19931
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necessary conduit or to facilitate the daily affairs of the local citizenry."9 Kokinda
held that the purpose of the post office sidewalk was to help provide for the most
efficient and effective postal delivery system.
As evidenced in the Kokinda plurality opinion, greater emphasis was placed on
the reasons for a forim's creation than had previously been accorded that factor.4
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in ISKCON II,4' interpreted Kokinda as
altering the Court's public forum analysis.43 This new emphasis on a forum's
purpose set the background for ISKCON IIL
III. International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee
ISKCON III resulted from more than fifteen years of litigation between the Port
Authority of New York (Port Authority) and the International Society for Krishna
Consciousness (the Irishnas). The Port Authority owns and operates thirty-three
facilities, including the John F. Kennedy International Airport, La Guardia Airport,
and Newark International Airport.M
The Krishnas are a New York not-for-profit religious corporation which advocates
the theological and missionary positions of the Krishna Consciousness. Krishna
members are required to perform a ritual known as sankirtan, which involves
disseminating religious literature and soliciting funds to support the religion.4
Sankirtan is integral to the practice of Krishna Consciousness and the principal
means of its support."
In 1975, the Krishnas challenged Port Authority regulations which prohibited the
continuous and repetitive distribution of literature and the solicitation of contribu-
tions from persons in the public areas of the Port Authority's airports.47 The
Krishnas initially sought access to airline-controlled property as well, but
subsequently settled with the airlines in 1987.' The Krishnas contended that the
39. Id. at 727.
40. Id. at 732.
41. Id. at 744 (Brennin, J., dissenting).
42. 925 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2709 (1991).
43. Id. at 580-81.
44. See ISKCON II, 925 F.2d at 578. The Port Authority was created in 1921 by a compact
consented to by Congress between the States of New York and New Jersey. See ISKCON 1, 721 F. Supp.
572 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). The three airports operated by the Port Authority are some of the busiest in the
world. See ISKCON II, 925 F.2d at 577. In 1986 they served approximately 79,000,000 travelers,
including more than half of the trans-Atlantic market. Id. Estimates project 110,000,000 travelers will
use the Port Authority airports by the latter part of the 1990s. Id.
45. ISKCON 1, 721 F. Supp. at 573.
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. The Krishnas settled with all the airlines prior to the district court decision. The district court
did not disclose the details of the settlement. See id. at 573.
When the Krishnas commenced suit in 1975, the group was seeking access to airline-controlled
property as well as Port Authority-controlled property. The district court held that the airlines were
indispensable parties and denied the Krishnas' motion for preliminary injunctive relief from the




Port Authority regulations unconstitutionally prohibited protected First Amendment
activity in a public forum 9 Prior to resolution of the Krishnas' motion for
summary judgment in 1987, the Port Authority adopted new regulations which
would permit literature dissemination and solicitation activities outside the
airports.'
A. ISKCON I: The District Court Decision
A magistrate, to whom the federal district court had referred all pretrial matters,
found that airport terminals are public forums." Consequently, the Port Authority's
regulations were held to be an unconstitutional restriction of the Krishnas' First
Amendment rights." After the magistrate's decision, the district court in ISKCON
Auth., 425 F. Supp. 681, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The Krishnas subsequently amended their complaint to
include as defendants several of the airlines who were leasing space from the Port Authority. See
ISKCON 1, 721 F. Supp. at 573.
In 1979, the airlines moved for dismissal, arguing that their prohibition of the Krishnas' activities was
not state action. The district court denied the airline's motion but certified the state action question to
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. The court of appeals accepted certification, and subsequently
remanded the case for further discovery and development of the evidentiary record. See International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Air Canada, 727 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir. 1984). On remand in 1984,
the district court referred the case to a federal magistrate for completion of all pretrial matters.
After discovery, the airlines again moved for dismissal. In 1987, the federal magistrate issued his
findings and recommended that the airlines motion for dismissal be denied because the state action
requirement had been met. ISKCON 1, 721 F. Supp. at 573. The airlines and the Krishnas subsequently
settled, which left the Port Authority as the only remaining defendant.
49. ISKCON I, 721 F. Supp. at 573.
50. Id. at 572-74 n.4. The new regulations provided in pertinent part:
B. Non-commercial activity at Port Authority air terminals which are not occupied by
a lessee, licensee or permittee is subject to the following conditions and restrictions:...
1. The following conduct is prohibited within the interior areas of buildings or
structures at an air terminal if conducted by a person to or with passers-by in a
continuous or repetitive manner.
(a) The sale or distribution of any merchandise, including but not lim-
ited to, jewelry, food stuffs, candles, flowers, badges and clothing.
(b) The sale or distribution of flyers, brochures, pamphlets, books or any
other printed or written material.
(c) The solicitation and receipt of funds.
2. The following conduct is prohibited at an air terminal:
(b) The performance of any ceremony, speech, song, carrying of any sign
or placard, or other such activity which constitutes a danger to persons or
property, or which interferes with the orderly formation and progression of
waiting lines, or which interferes with any of the following: pedestrian and/or
vehicular travel; the issuance of tickets or boarding pa~ses or equivalent
documents for air or ground transportation; luggage or cargo movement or
handling; the entry to and exit from vehicles; security procedures; government
inspection procedures; cleaning, maintenance, repair or construction
operations.
Id.
51. See ISKCON I, 721 F. Supp. at 573.
52. Id. at 574.
1993]
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I considered the effect of the Port Authority's new regulations on the scope of the
contested forum. The Port Authority argued that the entire airport, including the
exterior portions where sankirtan would be permitted, should be considered the
relevant forum. The court in ISKCON I concurred with the magistrate's finding that
the relevant forum is defined not by a proposed regulatory scheme but by the access
sought by the speaker.' Therefore, the interior portion of the airport was the only
relevant forum at issue since the Krishnas sought access to that area only.*r
The district court in ISKCON I next considered whether the Port Authority
regulations should be subjected to the public forum strict scrutiny standard or the
nonpublic forum reasonable basis standard.' The United States Supreme Court had
never decided whether airports constitute public forums. 6 However, every federal
circuit court that has considered the issue has classified large municipal airports as
public forums.'
The federal circuit courts uniformly held airports to be analogous to city streets
because airports are continuously open to the public and are lined with restaurants,
newsstands, shops, and other businesses for public use." Airports have been held
53. Id. at 574-75.
54. Id. at 575.
55. Id.
56. In Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569 (1987), the Court granted
certiorari on the question but overturned the speech regulations at issue on overbreadth grounds. Id. at
576. The status of the airport as a public forum was left unaddressed.
57. See, e.g., Jamison v. City of St. Louis, 828 F.2d 1280, 1282-84 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 987 (1988) (Lamert-St. Louis International Airport); Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Board of Airport
Comm'rs, 785 F.2d 791, 793-95 (9th Cir. 1986) (Los Angeles International Airport), aff'd on other
grounds, 482 U.S. 569 (1987); United States Southwest Africa/Namibia Trade & Cultural Council v.
United States, 708 F.2d 760, 763-68 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Washington's National and Dulles Airports);
Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 626-27 (5th Cir. Unit A Dec. 1981) (Dallas/Fort Worth Regional
Airport), cert. dismissed, 458 U.S. 1124 (1982); Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508
F.2d 921, 926 (7th Cir.) (Chicago's O'Hare Airport), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975); Kuszynski v.
City of Oakland, 479 F.2d 1130, 1131 (9th Cir. 1973) (Oakland Airport); see also Gannett Satellite
Informational Network v. Berger, 716 F. Supp. 140, 149 (D.N.J. 1989) (Newark Airport), affid in part
and rev'd in part, 894 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1990); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Wolke,
453 F. Supp. 869, 872 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (General Mitchell Field in Milwaukee); International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness v. Griffin, 437 F. Supp. 666, 672-73 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (Greater Pittsburgh
International Airport); Interational Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Rochford, 425 F. Supp. 734,742
(N.D. Ill. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 585 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1978) (Chicago's O'Hare
Airport); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Engelhardt, 425 F. Supp. 176, 180 (W.D. Mo.
1977) (Kansas City International Airport); cf. Wolin v. Port of New York Auth., 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.)
(Port Authority bus terminal a public forum), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968). But see International
Caucus of Labor Cormsn. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 724 F. Supp. 917, 924 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (Miami
International Airport terminal not a traditional public forum).
58. At the time the Krishnas submitted their motion for summary judgment to the district court, the
lobby of the International Arrivals Building at Kennedy Airport included two restaurants, two snack
stands, a bar, a postal substation and postal facility, a bank, a telegraph office, a duty-free boutique, a
drug store, a nursery, a barbar shop, two currency exchange facilities, a dental office, and an area for the
display of art exhibits. The east and west corridors of the same building had ten duty-free shops, five
bars, two snack stands, a telagraph office, two bookstores, two newsstands, a bank, four travel insurance




to be enclosed public thoroughfares, indistinguishable from municipal streets except
for their interior nature." The court in ISKCON I found the precedents of the
circuit courts and the analogy of airports to city streets to be persuasive. 6"
Nevertheless, the court contemplated the Port Authority's contentions that airports
are distinguishable from city streets because of the presence of captive audiences,
pedestrian congestion, unique security concerns, and the "singular purpose" of an
airport.6' The Port Authority raised the proposition from Lehman that the presence
of a captive audience is a factor to consider in public forum analysis. ISKCON I
found Lehman inapposite.6' The court characterized the Port Authority's analogy
between uses and conditions of an airport terminal and the interior of the city buses
in Lehman as "farfetched.""
ISKCON I also rejected the Port Authority's argument that pedestrian traffic
congestion and airport security concerns distinguish airports from city streets.64 The
court noted that traffic congestion and security problems are not unique to airport
facilities.6 5 For example, the streets of downtown Manhattan maintain their public
forum character despite the risk of crime or traffic congestion problems.' ISKCON
I held that concern over the efficient movement of traffic was not a sufficient
justification for prohibiting expression.6' Protection of captive audiences, traffic
congestion problems, and security concerns can appropriately be addressed by time,
place, and manner restrictions.'
The court summarily rejected the Port Authority's argument that because airports
have a singular purpose of facilitating air travel, terminals are thus distinguishable
from city streets.' The court agreed that the principal purpose of airports is to
facilitate transportation, but noted that city streets had the same primary purpose."
India store, and a boutique-sized Bloomingdale's. See ISKCON II, 925 F.2d at 578.
59. ISKCON I, 721 F. Supp. at 577 ("[V]e find it [im]plausible that the mere presence of a roof
would preclude the terminals' designation as public fora when, in every other relevant respect, they are
virtually identical to public streets and thoroughfares."); see also Jamison, 828 F.2d at 1283; United
States Southwest Africa/Namibia Trade & Cultural Council, 708 F.2d at 764; Chicago Area Military
Project, 508 F.2d at 925; cf Wolin, 392 F.2d at 89 (Port Authority bus terminal physically resembles city
street).
60. ISKCON 1, 721 F. Supp. at 577.
61. Id. at 577-79.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 578 n.8; see also United States Southwest Africa/Namibia Trade & Cultural Council, 708
F.2d at 767 ("A person in the airports' concourse or walkways who considers advertisement... to be
objectionable enjoys the freedom simply to walk away that a passenger on a bus does not.").
64. ISKCON 1, 721 F. Supp. at 578.
65. Id.
66. l
67. Id.; see also Fernandes, 663 F.2d at 619 (traffic concerns do not "justify the total exclusion of
those wishing to exercise free speech"); Wolin, 392 F.2d at 91-92 (absolute prohibition of pamphleteering
cannot be defended on the grounds that it would obstruct traffic).
68. ISKCON I, 721 F. Supp. at 578.
69. Id. at 579.
70. Id. at 579; see also Fernandes, 465 F. Supp. at 501 n.4 (N.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd, 663 F.2d 619
(5th Cir. Unit A Dec. 1981), cert. dismissed, 458 U.S. 1124 (1982).
1993]
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More important, the court held that courts must look beyond the principal purposes
of a forum to determine its public or nonpublic nature."' The district court in
ISKCON I concluded that no genuine issue of material fact existed and granted the
Krishnas' motion for summary judgment.'
B. ISKCON II: The Court of Appeals Decision
In ISKCON II the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment in ISKCON I concerning the Krishnas' distribution of
literature However, the appeals court reversed that part of the decision which
overturned the Port Authority ban on solicitation. 4 The court acknowledged that
prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Kokinda, it was prepared to
follow the decisions of the other circuit courts. 5 In light of Kokinda, however, the
court declined to adopt the holdings of the other circuit courts and held that the Port
Authority airports were nonpublic forums.'
The circuit court in ISKCON 11 interpreted Kokinda as fundamentally altering
public forum analysis by requiring courts to analyze a forum's particular purpose
in detail.77 According to the court, Kokinda elevated a forum's function and
purpose to crucial elements in determining a forum's classification."
The court analyzed the Port Authority airports using its interpretation of a
Kokinda "forum purpose test." ISKCON 11 analogized the airports to the sidewalk
in Kokinda. Like the sidewalk in Kokinda, the airports were characterized as remote
from pedestrian thoroughfares and intended solely to facilitate a single type of
transaction. The airport's facilitation of air travel was deemed unrelated to protected
speech activities." The court in ISKCON 11 also placed significance on the fact
that people using the terminal facilities were there solely for air travel-related
purposes.'
The court then compared the purposes of the Kokinda antisolicitation regulations
and the Port Authority's regulations and held that they served precisely the same
purposes.8 One purpose was the protection of facility users from the disruption of
in-person solicitation.' Another purpose was to ease pedestrian congestion.
Kokinda was interpreted by ISKCON II as distinguishing between the forum
classification of dedicated-use facilities and general-use facilities such as streets and
71. ISKCON 1, 721 F. Supp. at 579.
72. Id.
73. ISKCON 11, 925 1.2d at 582.
74. Id. at 581-82.
75. Id. at 580. Kokinda was decided subsequent to ISKCON I and subsequent to the cases cited
supra note 57.
76. ISKCON 11, 925 7.2d at 580.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 580-81. Fo: a discussion of Kokinda, see supra notes 27-43 and accompanying text.








parks.' Dedicated-use facilities such as airports or postal facilities would be
classified as nonpublic forums where the government may prohibit solicitation if a
reasonable basis exists.' General-use facilities would be classified as public
forums' where any government regulation of speech would be reviewed under
strict scrutiny.
The court in ISKCON II affirmed the earlier ISKCON I rejection of the Port
Authority ban on the distribution of literature.' The court noted that the four
justices in Kokinda who held that the post office sidewalk was a nonpublic forum
were influenced by the proposition that in-person solicitation is more "intrusive"
than pamphleteering." However, the court .in ISKCON II primarily based its
affirmance on a simple tally of how the justices voted in Kokinda." The court
determined that five of the justices would not prohibit distribution of literature on
the postal sidewalk in Kokinda.°' Because the court in ISKCON II considered
Kokinda controlling, it held that literature distribution could not be completely
banned at Port Authority airports either."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider: (1) whether
solicitation of contributions for a religious cause can be prohibited on a public
airport concourse; (2) whether a public corridor in a public airport is a public
forum; and (3) whether the government can forbid the distribution of literature if the
airport is held to be a nonpublic forum.'
C. ISKCON III: The Supreme Court Decision
The United States Supreme Court in ISKCON II1 affirmed the court of appeals
decision in ISKCON IL93 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist held
that airports are nonpublic forums and solicitation activities can be prohibited if a
reasonable basis exists. 9
ISKCON III held that neither by tradition nor purpose could airports be classified
as public forums.95 Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that airports are commercial
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 581-82.
87. Id. at 582.
88. Id. at 581.
89. Id. at 580-82.
90. Id. at 581-82.
91. Id. at 582.
92. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992) (ISKCON
II). A petition for rehearing en bane to the court of appeals was denied prior to the petition for
certiorari. See ISKCON II, 925 F.2d at 587.
93. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992) (ISKCON
III).
94. Id. at 2706,2708. Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and
Thomas. Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in
the judgment, of which Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter joined as to part I. Justice Souter filed
a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens.
95. Id. at 2706-07.
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enterprises that do not have the principal purpose of promoting the free exchange
of ideas. The Court found it significant that the Port Authority considered its
airport's purpose to be the facilitation of air travel, not the promotion of expres-
sion.' Further, ISKCON III noted the Port Authority had never dedicated the
airport terminal for expressive activities.98
ISKCON III held that airports have not historically been made available for
speech activity." Because the modem air terminal has appeared relatively recently,
the Court held airports could not be described as traditionally having been held in
the public trust for purposes of expressive activity."°
The Court discounted arguments analogizing historical speech activity at
transportation nodes such as rail stations, bus stations, wharves, and Ellis Island
with speech activities at airports.'' ISKCON III termed evidence of such historical
speech as irrelevant to public forum analysis, because sites such as bus and rail
terminals have traditionally been privately owned."° The practices of privately
held transportation centers were held not to affect the determination of the
government's regulatory authority over a public airport."° The Court limited its
public forum analysis to the public airport, refusing to equate airports with
transportation modes in general."°
ISKCON III held the Port Authority's ban on solicitation was reasonable." The
Court noted that solicitation activities may have a disruptive effect on airport
operations by impeding the flow of travelers through the airport." Travelers may
be slowed while deciding whether to contribute or alter their path to avoid the
solicitation."° ISKCON III also stated that face-to-face solicitation by skillful and
unprincipled solicitors presents a risk of duress that is an appropriate target of
regulation."
The Court deferred to the Port Authority's judgment that solicitation could best
be monitored by limiting the activity to the sidewalks outside the airports."°
Though the inconvenience caused by the Krishnas' activities may be small, ISKCON
III held that the Port Authority could reasonably worry that even such incremental
effects could cause much disruption in light of pedestrian congestion problems."'
96. Id. at 2707.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2706.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2707.
102. Id. at 2706.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2709.
106. Id at 2708.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id at 2708-09.




IV. ISKCON III and Public Forums
A. Free Speech Restrictions - First Amendment Implications
The ISKCON III decision, by implication, expands and liberalizes the govern-
ment's power to restrict speech. ISKCON III may expand the scope of the
government's power to restrict speech, not only in airports, but foreseeably to
analogous facilities such as bus, subway, and train stations as well.
One First Amendment value directly implicated in ISKCON III is solicitation
speech. Solicitation is a form of speech involving interests recognized and protected
by the First Amendment.'11 A nexus exists between solicitation and the communi-
cation of information and the advocacy of causes. Solicitation is characterized by
informative and persuasive speech."' A soliciting group will typically communi-
cate information about the organization's goals and activities, disseminate views and
ideas, and advocate the organization's cause, incidental to the group's quest for
raising funds."' A donor's contribution acts as a general expression of support for
the soliciting group and its views and represents an open exchange of ideas."'
A solicitation ban may quell the free interchange and advocacy of certain
information, ideas, and causes. An organization's ability to convey its message to
the public could be diminished as a result of being relegated into using a less
effective forum. Prohibiting or reducing the efficacy of group solicitation efforts
may have the ultimate effect of jeopardizing an organization's existence and
continuing ability to communicate its ideas."'
A danger exists that the government will distort the "marketplace of ideas" by
prohibiting certain types of speech. The government could deliberately or
inadvertently change the nature of public discussion by restricting expression like
solicitation and pamphleteering. The classification of airports and similar facilities
as nonpublic forums increases the risk that government will abuse the judicial
deference accorded it by the reasonable basis standard of review. The government
could more easily concoct "reasonable" justifications to prohibit certain speech than
would be the case under the nondeferential strict scrutiny standard of review."6
In any given situation, the government could seek to suppress ideas and information
it disfavors by finding distinct reasons why the message is inappropriate to that
forum.
In an age of growing insularity in which the traditional gathering place - the
"typical main street" - is being increasingly displaced by privately owned shopping
malls, the danger is that many forms of speech will be de facto regulated out of the
111. See Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781,788-89 (1988); Schaumberg v. Citizens
for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 629 (1980).
112. Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632.
113. Id
114. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976).
115. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 798-99 (1985).
116. See generally Farber & Nowak, supra note 7.
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"marketplace of ideas" for lack of an effective forum."'7 Modem socioeconomic
changes, such as the societal loss of a sense of community and the advent of
convenient, large shopping centers, have largely supplanted public streets and parks
as areas where the public congregates.' Because the base of much community
activity has shifted away from public streets and parks, owners of quasi-public
facilities such as shopping malls have, to an extent, displaced the state from control
of First Amendment forums."9 The Supreme Court's refusal in ISKCON III to
recognize new public forums that do not fit within the narrow tradition of streets
and parks devitalizes the public forum doctrine in current times of fast-changing
technology. Since most citizens now travel by automobile, and parks are more often
locales for crime rather than discussion, the ISKCON III court's inflexible
interpretation of the public forum doctrine could lead to a serious curtailment of
public expression." The increasing scarcity of effective public forums, where
meaningful interaction between speakers and the public can take place, magnifies
the importance of 1SKCON III in First Amendment jurisprudence.
B. Analysis of the Port Authority Regulations Under the Strict Scrutiny Standard
The classification of airports as nonpublic forums in ISKCON III is significant
because a forum's status determines the standard of review applied to speech
regulations in the forum.' While the reasonable basis standard of review merely
requires a government regulation to be reasonable and viewpoint-neutral, the strict
scrutiny standard applied to public forums requires regulation of expressive activity
to be narrowly drawn and promulgated in furtherance of a compelling state
interest.'" The Port Authority regulations would probably fail strict scrutiny
review. The Port Authority regulations prohibit all solicitation activities.'" The
regulations constitute time, place, or manner restrictions only in the sense that they
permit no manner of solicitation at any time or at any place in the airports. The
117. Individual states may protect the First Amendment right of access for speech activities on
privately owned property. In Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), the United States
Supreme Court held that free speech and the right to petition were fundamental rights which justified the
California Constitution's imposition of reasonable restrictions on private property rights. Id. at 88. The
Court thus upheld California's protection of a right of access for speech activities in the common areas
of privately owned shopping malls. Id.
The right to First Amrndment access to privately owned property was limited in Pruneyard.
Pruneyard left the protection of First Amendment access to privately owned property to the legislative
prerogative of the individual states. Furthermore, there is no federal or Constitutional protection for First
Amendment speech access to privately owned property. In Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), the
Court held that speech restrictions by private shopping malls is not government action and thus cannot
be Constitutionally prohibited. Id at 519-21.
118. See WARREN FR-EDMAN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH ON PRIVATE PROPERTY 37 (1988).
119. See Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 539 (Marshall, J., dissenting); How Shopping Malls Are Changing
Life in U.S., U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., June 18, 1973, at 43 (referring to shopping malls as a "New
Kind of Civic Center").
120. See ISKCON III, 112 S. Ct. at 2717 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
121. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45.46 (1983).
122. Id.




government has a heavy burden of justification when it seeks to prohibit an entire
category of speech."2' Under the strict scrutiny standard, the Port Authority would
have to show why nothing short of the total ban they imposed would be sufficient
to further their interests. The Port Authority would also have to demonstrate that
its regulations do not burden substantially more speech than is necessary to protect
its legitimate interests."z
One of the primary interests the Port Authority seeks to further by prohibiting the
Krishnas' solicitation activities is the expeditious movement of air travelers by
reducing congestion in the terminal passageways."z While the Port Authority has
a substantial interest in controlling the flow of traffic in its airports, that interest is
no greater than the identical governmental interest in controlling the movement of
traffic in public streets." There would seem to be no more substantial distinction
between the incompatibility of the government interest and free speech interest on
a public street than in a major airport terminal. In light of the fact that the Port
Authority permits the inefficiencies of movement caused by travelers' stopping to
patronize the numerous shops along the terminal passageways, the Port Authority
would have difficulty justifying why at least some administrative inconvenience
could not be tolerated from the Krishnas' solicitation activities."
The Port Authority could accommodate the Krishnas' First Amendment rights as
well as promote the expeditious movement of air travel by promulgating reasonable
time, place, and manner restrictions on solicitation short of a total ban. The Port
Authority could restrict solicitation activities during peak traffic hours and limit the
locations within the terminal buildings where solicitation is permitted. The Port
Authority could also restrict the numbers of solicitors allowed or require them to
obtain a permit. 29 Because a reasonable, narrowly drawn regulation on the
Krishnas' solicitation activities could accomplish the Port Authority's objective of
124. See Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 67, 72-74 (1981) (holding that the categorical
prohibition of a class of protected expression demands heightened scrutiny and evidence that the
complete exclusion is needed).
125. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989).
126. ISKCON III, 112 S. Ct. at 2708.
127. Id. at 2704.
128. See ISKCON II, 925 F.2d at 586 (Oakes, C.J., dissenting); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S.
312, 335 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("government [must]
regulate based on actual congestion ... rather than based on predictions that speech with a certain
content will induce [certain] effects"); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) ("[b]road
prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect ... Precision of regulation must be the
touchstone").
129. ISKCON II, 925 F.2d at 586 (Oakes, C.J., dissenting); see also Heffron v. International Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 654 (1981) (upholding restriction of the Krishnas' solicitation
activities at state fair to stationary booths); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Rockford,
585 F.2d 263, 268-69 (7th Cir. 1978) (upholding location restrictions on speech activities in airport);
Wolin v. Port of New York Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 93-94 (2d Cir.) (holding that Port Authority may set
reasonable limitations on the number of people who engage in F'rst Amendment activities as well as the
duration and places within their facilities where expression may be exercised), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940
(1968).
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reducing airport congestion, the Port Authority's regulation would probably be
overturned under strict scrutiny review as an unconstitutional restriction of speech.
ISKCON III states that the Port Authority has an interest in protecting airport
patrons from the "disruption" of in-person solicitation.'" However, speech may
not be banned merely because it may disturb or coerce its listener into action.'
Airport patrons are free to avoid the Krishnas' message by simply walking
away.'32 The First Amendment is often inconvenient. However, inconvenience
does not relieve the government of its obligation to tolerate speech.' The Port
Authority's paternalistic intent in protecting its patrons from bothersome or
disruptive speech would not rise to the level of a significant governmental interest
and would thus fail strict scrutiny review.
ISKCON III denied strict scrutiny protection to expressive activity in public
airports by classifying airports as nonpublic forums. Consequently, the Port
Authority regulations need only satisfy a deferential standard of reasonableness to
survive judicial review. Furthermore, even though the Port Authority could have
promulgated regulations more accommodating to expressive activities, the
reasonable basis standard only requires a regulation'to be reasonable; it does not
need to be the most reasonable limitation."
C. Application of Kokinda to ISKCON I
The majority of the judges in ISKCON II based their decision on the premise that
Kokinda had altered the Supreme Court's public forum analysis.'35 Here, the
majority of judges interpreted Kokinda as focusing on the distinction between public
dedicated-use facilities, and public general-use facilities.'36 The former would be
classified as nonpublic forums, and the latter would be classified as public forums.
The purpose and everyday functioning of a facility would be the sole determinant
of a forum's status.'3
ISKCON III did not explicitly address whether Kokinda established a public
forum purpose test. The Court, however, examined the purpose of the modern
airport as well as its historical use as the primary factors in determining forum
status.'38 ISKCON 111, like Kokinda, engaged in a fact-specific inquiry regarding
a forum's purpose. Cases forming the foundation of the public forum doctrine
analyzed whether expressive activity was compatible with the normal functioning
130. ISKCON 11, 112 S. Ct. at 2708.
131. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982).
132. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (stating that those offended or annoyed by
speech can "avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities ... by averting their eyes").
133. ISKCON 111, 112 S. Ct. at 2719 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
134. Id at 2708 (citing United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 735-36 (1990)).
135. See ISKCON J1, 925 F.2d at 580.
136. Id. at 581-82.
137. See id. at 584 (Oakes, C.J., dissenting).




of the forum.'39 ISKCON III and Kokinda go further, applying principles of
analysis developed in cases addressing novel and specialized contexts."4 The
Court had never previously applied a reasonableness test to the context of
government property open to the public. 4'
In Kokinda, only four justices agreed that the post office sidewalk at issue was
a public forum. Justice Kennedy never reached the issue of whether the sidewalk
was a public forum. Justice Kennedy stated that a strong argument existed that
because of the wide range of activity that the government permitted on the sidewalk,
it was more than a nonpublic forum.42
The circuit court in ISKCON II elevated one of the important factors used in
Kokinda's analysis to the status of the sole determining factor. In Kokinda, Justice
O'Connor assessed several factors besides the sidewalk's purpose, in determining
that the post office sidewalk was not a public forum. Justice O'Connor considered
the sidewalk's location, degree of public access, and whether post office sidewalks
had historically been used for public communication and free assembly.'43 In
contrast to the circuit court's narrow interpretation of Kokinda, Justice O'Connor
asserted that whether a forum had traditionally served the role of a public forum
illuminated the Court's analysis and was the critical inquiry in Kokinda.'" The
Supreme Court's analysis in ISKCON III was broader than the circuit court and did
not focus on any single factor as being dispositive of a forum's status. Like
Kokinda, ISKCON III evaluated the traditional use of the relevant forum, as well as
the forum's purpose.'45
Kokinda held that the post office sidewalk at issue lacked the characteristics of
the traditional public sidewalk which would be open to expressive activity.'" This
is the major factual distinction between Kokinda and ISKCON IlL Unlike the
139. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 743-46; Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116 ("The crucial question is whether
the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a
particular time.").
140. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 746-48. ISKCON III cited Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense &
Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 788 (1985), as authority that a forum's purpose is a relevant factor in public
forum analysis. Cornelius considered whether advocacy groups could be excluded from participation in
the Combined Federal Campaign, a fund-raising drive held exclusively in the federal workplace. The
Court held the Combined Federal Campaign was a nonpublic forum. Id. at 806. The Perry decision,
cited extensively in both ISKCON III and Kokinda, held the internal mail system of a public school was
not a public forum. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
Both Cornelius and Perry took place in distinctive contexts where the government created a
nontraditional forum to accommodate speech for a special purpose. In contract, JSKCON III and Kokinda
involved places freely open to the public. Justice Kennedy noted that the need for heightened First
Amendment protection has more force in the context of government property open to the public than in
situations where the government has created a special purpose nontraditional forum as in Cornelius and
Perry. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 738 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
141. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 748.
142. See id. at 737 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 727-29.
144. Id. at 729; see also ISKCON 1i, 925 F.2d at 584 (Oakes, C.J., dissenting).
145. See JSKCON III, 112 S. Ct. at 2706-08.
146. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727.
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relatively isolated post office sidewalk in Kokinda, the Port Authority airports are
conceptually and physically comparable to traditional public forum streets.'47 The
airports are bustling with social and commercial activity, teeming with shops,
restaurants, and a multitude of other businesses catering to the public. It is doubtful
whether the ISKCON III plurality would have voted that the sidewalk in Kokinda
was a nonpublic fcrum if it had similarly been lined with such a vast array of
activity. ISKCON III did not focus on the conceptual and physical characteristics
of airports in relation to traditional public forums.
D. Forum Purpose Analysis in ISKCON III
ISKCON III and the circuit court regarded the government's purpose for a forum
to be one of the primary factors in determining a forum's status. The analysis in
ISKCON III, in effect, grants the government sole power to classify a forum.
ISKCON III held that public forum status depends in part on the government's
defined purpose for property or a decision by the government to dedicate the
property to expressive activity.4 ' The Court's treatment of forum purpose is
logically dubious and fails to objectify the public forum inquiry.
Most government property has a purpose other than the accommodation of First
Amendment expressive activities. Streets are built for the purpose of facilitating
transportation, sidewalks are built for pedestrians, and parks are usually opened to
provide recreation and beauty to a city. The primary purpose of an airport is to
facilitate air travel; the primary purpose of streets is to accommodate automobile
travel.
It is difficult to conceive how constitutional significance can be attached to the
fact that airports involve travel by airplane, and that streets involve travel by
automobile. 9 Merely examining a forum's purpose does little to illuminate the
compatibility of expressive activity to the forum. Few public forums would remain
for the exercise of First Amendment expression if a forum's purpose determined its
status. Because streats and parks are not constructed with the primary purpose of
facilitating speech, under the ISKCON III analysis even the quintessential public
forums would seem to lack the requirements necessary to constitute a public forum.
E. Public Forums and the ISKCON III Historic Tradition Test
The public forum doctrine originated with Justice Roberts' dictum in Hauge v.
Committee for Industrial Organization. 5 Justice Roberts noted that streets and
parks had "immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public ... for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions. '
147. See ISKCON 1, 721 F. Supp. at 576.
148. ISKCON Ii, 112 S. Ct. at 2706-07.
149. See ISKCON 11, 925 F.2d at 585 (Oakes, C.J., dissenting).
150. The Hauge decision is discussed supra note 8.




ISKCON III decreed that because airports are a relatively new form of property,
they could not be described as having been held immemorially in the public trust
for purposes of expressive activity."5 Thus, airports were held to fail the tradition
requirement for identification as a public forum. 53 ISKCON III disregarded the
purpose of the public forum doctrine and converted Justice Roberts' observations
into a narrow test, effectively foreclosing the recognition of new forums.
The public forum doctrine is tied to the First Amendment liberties it was created
to protect." Although the public forum doctrine has its origins in Supreme Court
dictum, the right of speech protected by the doctrine stems from the Constitution's
recognition that government may not control the speech of a free people.155
Reliance on history as an organizing rule leads to arbitrary line drawing. 5 By
focusing on a forum's historical pedigree, attention is diverted from the First
Amendment values at stake in a given case. In ISKCON III consideration of First
Amendment values was subordinate to the Court's narrow focus on historic
tradition. The Court has closed the public forum category by its very definition of
such forums as "traditional."'57 The public forum doctrine retains no future
relevance without judicial recognition that open, public spaces which are suitable
for expression may be public forums despite lacking a historical lineage. 5
Conclusion
Before ISKCON III, First Amendment public forum analysis involved a complex
balancing of several distinct factors and interests. Besides analyzing the purpose and
tradition of a forum, courts considered the character of the forum's surrounding, the
pattern of activity associated with the forum, and whether expressive activity was
compatible with the forum's use. The governmental purposes for a forum were
balanced against the tradition of public access and the interests of those wishing to
utilize the forum for expressive activities.
Important interests are at stake on both sides of the First Amendment public
forum issue. Both the government and the public have an interest in maintaining the
efficient use of publicly owned facilities. Individuals and organizations have an
interest in communicating their ideas to the public. The First Amendment also
recognizes that the public has an interest in freely receiving ideas and information.
The public forum analysis equation recognized both first Amendment concerns and
governmental proprietary interests by giving both interests appropriate weight.
ISKCON III alters that equation by making a forum's status depend on the
government's defined purpose for the property, effectively granting the government
plenary authority to restrict speech by fiat.
152. See ISKCON III, 112 S. Ct. at 2706.
153. Id. at 2708.
154. See Kalven, supra note 7, at 14, 19.
155. See ISKCON III, 112 S. Ct. at 2716-17 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
156. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 544 (1985).
157. See ISKCON III, 112 S. Ct. at 2724 (Souter, J., dissenting).
158. See id. at 2717 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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ISKCON III froze the public forum doctrine into a narrow framework of static
categories, prohibiting the creation of new public forums which do not fit into the
tradition of streets, sidewalks, and parks. ISKCON III has closed public forums as
a class by defining such forums as traditional. The Court negated the future
relevance of the public forum doctrine by foreclosing the recognition of new public
forums as society changes and new technologies emerge. ISKCON III devitalized
the public forum doctrine by eliminating its flexibility.
ISKCON III has potentially far-reaching ramifications. The government's power
to restrict speech in public areas has been significantly expanded. Emanating from
ISKCON III, government authority to restrict speech could logically extend beyond
airports to encompass analogous public facilities such as bus, subway, and train
stations. Marginal voices may be more easily excluded, altering the dialogue heard
by the public. Indirectly, ISKCON III could affect the survival of many nonprofit
organizations by elirrdnating or severely reducing their ability to raise support
funding. The free interchange of information and ideas between these groups and
the public could similarly be extinguished.
The public forum doctrine was established to protect the First Amendment
guarantee of free speech from government interference. In ISKCON III, the Court
ignored the doctrines' underlying purpose; restricting public forums to those which
could be described a3 "traditional," and granting the government the power to
classify a forum by defining its purpose. The Court's analysis makes it clear that
few, if any, types of property will be granted public forum status in the future.
Gary E. Newberry
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